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Opinion on the work of Krzysztof Zawisza "The semantic solution to the Liar's Paradox and some other antinomies"

As a member of MENSA and LUDOMIND ,TETRIQ ,GENERIQ as a person with a confirmed ability to think logically and dealing with the development of this ability to think logically - I was asked to give an opinion on the work of Krzysztof Zawisza entitled "The semantic solution to the Liar's Paradox and some other antinomies".

Having familiarized myself with this work and after assessing the logical correctness of its main theses, I conclude as follows:

1. The work in question contains about a dozen reasoning of a general technological nature (some of them have been additionally formalized in the generally accepted symbolism of mathematical logic). Each of these reasoning independently leads to the conclusion that the famous, apparently paradoxical, liar's sentence is in fact a logically meaningful and false sentence. The work also includes the solution of the classic circle of liars and a few less known antinomies. In my opinion, I will focus on the liar's antinomy.

2. All the reasoning contained in the work I am assessing are logically correct. Their correctness is guaranteed by the basic principles of logic, such as the principle of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle.

3. Therefore, the conclusion should be accepted (as proven many times in the reviewed work), that both the liar's sentence in its classic form and the sentences of the classic circle of liars should be considered meaningful and false sentences.

Checking the correctness of the theses contained in the work by Krzysztof Zawisza, I started with my own logical analysis of the content of the classic liar's sentence and came to the following conclusion. The Liar says what he says about is false. The Liar is thus contradicting what he says about. However, what the Liar says about is also what he says (the liar's sentence refers to itself). Thus, by denying what he says about, he is also contradicting what he says. And by denying what he says, he is denying that he says.

So, by claiming what he says is false, he is claiming that he is not saying what he says. For by claiming that what he is saying is not true, he is saying that it is not true that he says what he says, and that it is true that he is says what he doesn't say. However, since no one can say not what he says (the principle of non-contradiction) or say what he does not say (as above), the Liar, saying that what he says is false, that is, saying that he doesn't say what he does say, says falsehood.

In other words, the Liar, by arguing that what he is saying now is false, states that what he is actually saying is not what he is saying. This implies the necessity to recognize the liar's sentence as a false sentence on the basis of the logical principle of non-contradiction. For the principle of non-contradiction implies the falsehood of meaningful and, at the same time, contradictory statements.

The Author also draws attention to the self-contradiction of the liar's sentence and to the fact that one cannot really admit to lying in a self-contradicting sentence, because the admission will be contradicted by itself, i.e. false.

Considering the remaining reasoning presented in the paper also leads to the conclusion that they are logically correct, and the conclusion drawn from them is also correct, i.e. true.

The work of Krzysztof Zawisza focuses on the purely logical side of the issue. However, it also refers to the historical background. It analyzes the work of scholars dealing with the theory of truth and / or the liar's paradox: from Parmenides and Plato to Alfred Tarski, Saul Kripke and Rudolf Schüßler. The article also lists contemporary works by Polish logicians Piotr Łukowski and Jan Czerniawski. Piotr Łukowski proved that a certain, formal version of the liar's sentence constructed by him is a logically false sentence, which paves the way for the final solution to the liar's paradox in the classic version. Krzysztof Zawisza also deals with the answer to the question why - despite the fact that logicians and philosophers have been dealing with this issue for almost 2.5 thousand years - the correct solution to the liar's paradox has not yet been presented. This makes the work complete.

In conclusion, I state that the reviewed work presents (and presents it in many independent ways) a logically correct, and at the same time final, solution to the liar's paradox.