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Leszek Mazurek's
review of the paper

"The semantic solution to the Liar's Paradox and some other antinomies"

by Krzysztof Zawisza.

After detailed study of this paper, I fully understood all presented examples and can confirm that logical deduction together with all examples presented in this work are logically correct and the final conclusion of this work which is

"The Liar's Sentence is meaningful and false sentence"

is also **correct.**

Conclusions from presented reasonings are also fully aligned with my independent logical analysis of this subject.

To understand this sentence, one has to recognize that there are two logical relations related to each sentence. First one between

Author → sentence

and second

meaning of the sentence → reality.

When author is saying the sentence, he „states" that it is true. We can easily extend every sentence to form „The author states ...<sentence>". By this, we see that the author of the sentence somehow assigns Truth to his own sentence. In case of the Liar's Sentence, the Liar negates this presupposition of the truth of his sentence and thus he states falsehood. In second relation we check if the meaning of the sentence matches reality and if yes, we can say that this sentence is true. If not, the sentence is false (it is the subject of the classical and correspondence theories of truth). In case of the Liar's Sentence, we easily see that meaning of the sentence (that he lies) does not match with reality, because in this case reality to which the sentence relates is the same sentence, which the author states. In turn, the meaning of this sentence is to deny its own compliance with reality. Therefore, the compliance of the Liar's Sentence with reality implies the lack of compliance. According to the laws of propositional calculus and more broadly, according to the principles of logical thinking, it is always false to state that the Liar's Sentence is consistent with reality. For a statement that implies its own negation is always false.

There is another way to approach the Liar's Sentence.

Everything what I'm saying is a lie. [z]

But this sentence is what I'm saying therefore it is a lie. [$\sim z$]

Thus, we have [$z \rightarrow \sim z$].

So, my statement is false, because it implies its own negation [$T(\,)$ – truth function, $T(z)=0$].

We check in opposite direction.

It is false that everything what I'm saying is a lie. [$\sim z$]
It means that something from what I'm saying is true.
Therefore, it is not true that everything what I'm saying is a lie.

[$\sim z \nrightarrow z$]

So, we do not have any antinomy here, but only false Liar's Sentence.

In the paper of Krzysztof Zawisza this is presented by multiple similar examples, together with historical perspective and with reconstruction of the Parmenidean, Platonic and Aristotle's theories of Truth. The Author shows that all these theories are in fact one and the same theory and that this theory agrees with our basic, logically necessary intuitions. An examination of the semantics of Liar's Paradox with this theory also leads to the immediate conclusion that the Liar's Sentence is simply a false sentence, although it already states its own falsehood. The Author shows that each approach to the Liar's Sentence in accordance with the classical logic leads to the conclusion that the Liar's Sentence is simply a logically false sentence, and the apparent antinomy of this sentence is only a psychological and cognitive trick. Finding the solution to the most important antinomy - the Liar's Paradox, changes our understanding what logic and our reason is.

The work of Krzysztof Zawisza is very well done and I believe that it should be easily accepted by scientific community.